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A Nasty Act?
Kamlesh Patel1
Like most newly-appointed cross-bench peers, I went into House of Lords with the expectation and
intention that whilst there I will be able to do something to the good in the areas for which my
professional background has prepared me. That background includes five years as MHAC Chairman, and
a number of years as a member of the MHAC before that. 
I am not aware of any planning, on the part of anyone, behind the fact that my entry into the House of
Lords was, more or less, coincident with the introduction of the Mental Health Bill. But whereas I might
otherwise have looked to my first months of Westminster life as a time to become gently acclimatised to
the Upper House, instead I was faced with a very steep learning curve and a Bill that touched very directly
on my professional background and concerns. 
The highly stylised forms of language and behaviour in the House of Lords take some getting used to. 
The House strives towards courtly manners, consensus and multi-partisan co-operation2, but it
occasionally erupts into more recognisable Westminster hostilities, especially when a member calls for a
vote (a ‘division’). Towards evening, when there are fewer Lords around, such a call is unlikely and
debates can take on the unreal aspect of phoney war. But up until dinner-break the House may erupt into
its great set-piece divisions, with the party-affiliated troops marshalled by their respective whips through
one or the other voting lobby. A vote late in the day can appear to be less a test of the merits of an
argument, than a test of the relative strengths of the whips offices to have persuaded party-affiliated
members to remain in the vicinity of the House. 
From such a combination of diplomatic compromise and tests of numeric strength emerges what Lord
Carlile memorably described as “that often hilarious concept – the intention of Parliament”3. But however
much the results of votes may depend upon all sorts of extraneous factors, it seems clear from the tenor
of its debates that the Upper House demanded and, however temporarily, won some important
amendments to the Government’s proposals. 
Viewed from the time of writing, the Bill still has an uncertain future. Before the Upper House had done
with the Bill, the Minister in the Commons announced her intention to undo its key amendments4. This
may signal some rough water ahead, whether or not such intransigence leads in the Commons to any
significant revolt of back-benchers from the Government whip5. There is no guarantee that the Upper
House will be prepared to give way on some issues of principle. The late and very much lamented Lord
Carter, who was a member of the Joint Committee scrutinising the draft Mental Health Bill of 2004,
noted in the context of another debate that “It is a curious feature of our constitution that, once a
Government have a working majority in the Commons, the separation of powers between the executive
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and the legislature is more evident in the Lords”6. Indeed, Lord Owen warned Government at the start
of our debates that it has already lost Bills in this area and could well lose this one unless it showed “a
good deal of feeling and understanding for expert opinion”7. 
On some matters, the Ministers in the Lords did listen to expert opinion and relatively happy
compromises were reached over some questions, such as the legal basis for the admission of minors8, or
the introduction of an ability to transfer between places of safety9. Indications have been given that
further Government amendments will appear in the Commons to address the call for patient choice in
identifying Nearest Relatives10 and for some statutory provisions around advocacy11. Alongside some of
the uncontested ‘tidying up’ provisions in this Bill (notable amongst which is a reversal of the current
restrictions over who may sit on a Foundation Trust managers’ review hearing12), these amount to some
good reasons to hope that the Bill is not, in the end, lost. 
What follows is a step back from the fine detail of the Bill and its amendments, to enable a wider view of
the polarised positions occupied by Government and its detractors. 
Libertarians and Paternalists?
The Conservative front bench has accused the Government of starting from “a profoundly paternal
attitude towards mental health patients…that accepts only grudgingly that the autonomy and decision-
making ability of those with a mental illness matter at all and … would actually much prefer these people
to jolly well accept what is good for them whether they like it or not”13. The Minister, of course, disputed
this14. Government’s general response to this charge has been to argue that it has struck an appropriate
balance between coercive powers and protective limitations on such power. Thus the Government
characterises the real contention as between its Bill, which seeks to establish specific safeguards and
thresholds in the working criteria for compulsion, and the Bill’s critics, who are seeking either
unnecessary and dangerous limitations on psychiatric power, or else declaratory but essentially otiose
phrases and words that would signal good intentions but have little practical effect15.
I have great sympathy for Lord Hunt’s position as the responsible Government Minister in the House of
Lords debate, who has a long-standing interest in mental health service provision, is highly regarded by
noble Lords on all sides of the House16, and who inherited this Bill with his re-appointment to the front
benches. I have some sympathy with the general proposition that a good mental health law would be
drafted to be so explicit in its applicability that there should be little need for it to contain declaratory
statements of intent. But, even if such legislation can be drafted, I do not believe that this Bill is it. In any
case, there continue to be worrying signals from the Government camp that the intention behind the Bill
is actually to leave the scope of compulsory powers to be determined by professional discretion rather than
by any meaningfully restrictive statutory criteria. 
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Before the Lords debated and voted upon the question of whether the Bill should set out more explicit
exclusions to the scope of Mental Health Act powers17, an all-party group meeting was told by the
Government’s mental health czar, Professor Appleby, that “every exclusion is a person not receiving the
treatment they need”18. A similar argument was whispered to my colleagues in the corridors of the Palace
of Westminster to warn against any amendments seeking to restrict the scope of the general criteria for
compulsion. The response to Government defeats in the Upper House by the Minister in the Commons
(the Rt Hon Rosie Winterton MP) took the same line, stating that “every barrier that is put in the way
of getting treatment to people with serious mental health problems puts both patients and the public at
risk”19 and, rather curiously (given that the context here was the scope of community treatment orders,
which even under Government plans could only be imposed upon a patient who is already detained in
hospital under the Act), “every restriction is a patient untreated, a family in distress”20. 
The assumption that the law should not fetter clinicians in helping those who need help has a superficial
reasonableness (or at least anyone challenging it will feel the chill of shrouds being waved in his or her
direction), but in the context of mental health law concerned with compulsion it actually has rather
ominous implications. Not least, it conflates the notion of receiving treatment for mental disorder with
the notion of compulsory treatment for mental disorder, and therefore appears to assume that people with
serious mental health problems cannot be helped unless they are ‘helped’ by force. Of course the 1983
Act is built upon the legal reforms of the 1950s which took precisely the opposite view, and elevated
informal treatment as the basis upon which mental health services should be provided unless and until
compulsion could be justified in any individual case. There is a risk in the Government’s stance of not so
much updating the law for the start of our new century as pushing it back to the early years of the last
century, when ‘voluntary’ status as a psychiatric patient was a privilege. If this is really the direction that
Government wishes to travel, what would a potential patient have to demonstrate in order not to be
‘helped’ through compulsory psychiatric intervention, especially given the inherent difficulties of
predicting actual risk to the public from individuals with mental disorder? And what signal does the
Government’s apparent focus on compulsion as the only means of service provision send to all those
outreach workers whose daily professional lives focus on helping patients access services before
compulsion becomes necessary? 
In reality, of course, the criteria for psychiatric intervention of any sort is often determined by questions
of resources. Where patients are left untreated in the care of, or to the distress of their families, it is more
likely to be because they are waiting for an over-subscribed hospital bed, or in contact with similarly
overstretched or underdeveloped community teams. Ministers quite understandably become peevish that
not enough credit is given to Government for the ways in which it has sought to increase resource levels
on the ground. It is unfortunate for them that the legislative agenda over the last seven years has
distracted both attention and, in the end, resources, from continuing initiatives to establish specialist
services for previously marginalised diagnostic groups, such as people with personality disorder, and
suitable services for previously ill-served demographic groups, such as women or children. It is something
of a political feat to have alienated such a comprehensive body of user, carer and professional mental
health groups in the midst of such a development programme. 
17 Amendment No.3 at report stage: see Hansard HL
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Discretionary powers: clinician knows best? 
Although the ministerial line is that the Bill struck a “balance between getting treatment to those who
need it, putting in place patient safeguards and minimising the risk to the public”21, it seems to me that
the Government’s approach is in fact skewed by a dangerously paternalistic view of the purpose of mental
health legislation. I accept, of course, that there is a balance to be struck between the areas that the
Minister mentions. It has also been argued that striking the right balance between paternalism and
protection, on the one hand, and patient determination and autonomy on the other, is as achievable as
finding the Holy Grail22. That may be so, but I do not think that the Government’s Bill would, at least in
its original state, have improved upon such balance as there already is in the provisions of the 1983 Act.
In its desire to ‘help’ mentally disordered persons (or to keep them from the public) by catching them in
a broad-cast net of compulsion, Government failed to pay sufficient attention to the need for the law to
protect personal autonomy from unwarranted interference from the state.
Certainly the criteria for compulsion that were first proposed under the Bill did not establish such
safeguards, but instead relied on ill-defined and therefore highly subjective terms such as ‘appropriate’ at
their core. This leaves too much to the discretion of those operating coercive powers. In contrast to the
Government’s apparent approach, the great majority of those who spoke in the House of Lords’ debates
addressed the proposed changes in the law from a starting point that assumes that mental health
legislation cannot be simply an enabling Act to provide powers for the interference of health bodies in
the lives of people of this country, but must also be a means of circumscribing and limiting those powers.
They have pointed to areas where the Government’s proposals created ill-defined powers that would rely
heavily on the discretion of practitioners, and suggested and voted for ways in which to tighten the
criteria. I am therefore deeply disappointed that the Minister in the other place announced her view that
“for the sake of mental health patients themselves and the safety of the public, these changes must be
overturned” even before the Upper House had completed its reading of the Bill23. Government seems to
be incapable either of listening or understanding the very real concerns that were set out in the debates
of the Upper House.
The purpose of psychiatric compulsion
One area in which the Minister signalled her intention to overturn the House of Lords’ vote was with
regard to its determination that therapeutic benefit should form a criterion for compulsion under the Act.
The Minister’s statement does not acknowledge the fact that the Lords voted upon an amendment that
was already a compromise solution aimed to meet Government half way24. It instead relies upon the same
arguments, although still no actual evidence, for the need to reverse the Lords’ vote as were originally
employed against the test of ‘treatability‘ that the Bill was designed, in part, to remove. Firstly, it is
suggested that patients and their lawyers’ are scheming of ways to convince the courts that the tests must
be interpreted in some way as to ‘secure premature discharge for some of the most dangerous patients’25.
This is unnecessarily alarmist, there being very little prospect that the courts would reverse precedent
interpretations of ‘treatability’ that include not only symptomatic treatment but even the beneficence of
care in a structured environment. Secondly, and here I find either muddled logic or else an outrageous
sleight of hand in the Government’s argument, it is suggested that mental health professionals
21 ibid., n.19 above.
22 Unsworth, C (1987) The Politics of Mental Health
Legislation. Oxford University Press. 
23 ibid,. n.4 above 
24 Hansard HL 19/02/07, col 927(Lord Carlile)
25 ibid,. n.4 above.
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misinterpret the existing test and incorrectly exclude potential patients as a result, and therefore the test
must be expunged from the Act to remove this excuse for services to deny services to patients. It is by
now a well-worn, if still important, argument against the muddled thinking that, if professionals are
misinterpreting the Act, this is a matter for training rather than new legislation. In the words of one of
the qualified psychiatrists on the Lords’ benches, ‘bad psychiatry does not justify bad legislation’26. 
To be worthwhile legislation, the Mental Health Act must provide a check against unfettered clinical
discretion and delineate the powers given to mental health professionals over patients who cannot or do
not consent. The Bill is better in this regard following the amendments made in its passage through the
Lords: no doubt it could be better still. Whilst some practitioners and commentators have questioned
what all the fuss is about on the issue of ‘treatability’, given the current very broad definition of that term,
my own view is that here is an issue where Parliament needs to set down a specific view, and articulate
that in legislation, so that the law is explicit in its intention and in its basis as a health measure.
Government would have Parliament remain silent over the purpose of the use of compulsory psychiatric
intervention, and this is not acceptable. 
Countering institutional racism in psychiatric coercion
The fact of gross overrepresentation in the detained patient population of patients from Black and
minority ethnic groups is now generally recognised. It is also generally agreed that there is an urgent need
to do something about this, although of course what exactly is to be done is a more contentious matter.
It is, I think, a valid question to ask whether there is anything that can be put into mental health
legislation that can address this problem in any practical way. After all, the overrepresentation takes place
in a legal context where public authorities are already under a specific duty not only to eliminate racial
discrimination, but also to promote equality of opportunity and good race relations27. I take the view that
a declaratory statement in the 1983 Act would serve to remind practitioners that they operate under this
general duty, and can only strengthen whatever effect if does have. 
The compromise reached over the question of whether there should be a statement of principles on the
face of the Act will at least guide practitioners towards a similar message in the Code of Practice, but the
Code already contains an anti-discrimination principle28 and it could be said that this has not proved
effective up to now. Perhaps more importantly, given that decisions regarding psychiatric coercion are
inevitably value-judgments, the most important task of a responsible legislature to avoid perpetuating or
fostering discrimination would be to make the criteria for such decisions as precise – and justiciable – as
possible. By contrast, the open-textured nature of legal powers in the Bill as presented to Parliament could
have removed some existing checks on further overrepresentation of Black and minority ethnic patients. 
Legislating for services
One other way in which the provisions of a Mental Health Act could ensure that patients receive
appropriate treatment is, of course, by establishing some kinds of reciprocal duties upon services to
provide such treatment to those in need. 
Government has very emphatically rejected some amendments that aimed to make such duties explicit
26 Hansard HL 10/01/07, col 312 (Lord Alderdice)
27 Race Relations Act 1976, s.71, as amended by Race
Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, s.2. 
28 Department of Health (1999) Mental Health Act Code of
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in this Bill, including my own amendment that would have given statutory force to the requirements of
care-planning. The argument against such amendments is that ring-fencing or prioritising one aspect of
the health or social care service may be at the cost of other aspects of such services, and that legal
requirements to concentrate resources on specific aspects can distort local planning and accountability,
or even fetter the legal discretion of the Secretary of State29.
Such a proposition is irrefutable at an abstract level, but the realities of health and social care service
provision are already subject to some such pressures, and some of these stem directly from legislation. 
A straightforward example is section 4 of the NHS Act 1977, which establishes a duty to provide ‘special
hospitals’ for dangerous and offender patients. Furthermore, there is a sense in which the Mental Health
Act 1983 itself can be seen as a series of legal requirements for the provision of particular services, such
as the assessment of specifically qualified professionals, as a condition of using coercive powers of
detention. The 1983 Act also sets out explicit duties, such as the duty under section 117 to provide
aftercare to some detained patients upon discharge; the requirement to specify hospitals that have
arrangements for admitting emergencies (section 140) and the duty to provide sufficient numbers of
approved social workers (section 114). 
Although it may be ungracious to point this out, the Government position is also inconsistent in its
approach to this issue, as is evidenced, for example, by its concessionary offer to look again at making
specific provision in the Bill requiring authorities to provide advocacy services for detained patients in
response to amendments tabled by Lord Williamson and myself. Of course, this is hardly a revolutionary
use of the law: section 35 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 establishes a clear precedent for the use of
mental health legislation to establish such a positive duty to provide advocacy services to vulnerable
patients. 
Whilst I can sympathise with ministerial exasperation over the stream of claims for priority in terms of
resources from this or that aspect of the health service or from various patient groups, the position of a
detained psychiatric patient is unique amongst health service recipients and the law already
discriminates, in various ways, such a patient from the rest of healthcare provisions. I very much
welcomed the amendment aiming to provide that child patients should be accommodated in suitable
facilities30. It is Government policy that this should be so, but in the current financial climate it is difficult
to see how the many health authorities who are looking for substantial financial savings will turn that
policy into a reality. It is obvious that such authorities who are faced with difficult decisions over
balancing their budgets will, of course, look for savings in those parts of their service that are neither their
core business nor a legal requirement. In the absence of any legal requirement to provide services,
development in these areas may stall and existing services will always be under threat. These threats are
very real. In relation to children’s services, the House of Lords heard that between 1999 and 2006 there
has been only a four per cent increase in general child and adolescent mental health beds between 1999
and 200631 In relation to advocacy services, as I write this I have a letter on my desk announcing the
closure after ten years’ work of one London-based advocacy group, because the Primary Care Trust
(which is looking to make substantial savings to reduce its overspend) has withdrawn funding. 
29 Hansard HL 26/02/07, col 1374 (Lord Hunt)
30 Hansard HL 26/02/07, cols 1365-1378
31 Hansard HL 16/02/07, col 1375 (Baroness Meacher)
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A nasty Act?
Late in the evening of the House of Lords’ penultimate day of debate at report stage of the Bill, I suggested
to a slightly startled House that the differences in provisions made regarding advocacy services in the
Mental Health Act and Mental Capacity Act are
not only unethical in terms of equity of provision but dangerous. It is dangerous because we run the risk
of having two statutes that have considerable overlap. The Mental Capacity Act is, and is seen to be,
forward-thinking, concerned with patient rights and protections, and so on, whereas the Mental Health
Act appears to be a set of second-rate provisions, outdated attitudes and the shifty machinations of a
Home Office forever seeking unfettered powers of social control. 
Every time we allow some unjustifiable inequity between the way in which these two statutory
frameworks deal with patients, we move a step closer towards the Manichean system of a nice mental
health law and a nasty mental health law. The danger, as this House has heard before, is that the nasty
mental health law drives away those whom we would wish to seek early treatment, not least on grounds
of safety.32
I stand by these words, notwithstanding the eyebrows that were raised at their tone. I think that there is
a real danger in the Government’s announcements over its Bill, as exemplified by Rosie Winterton MP’s
response to the Lords’ amendments, of creating a perception – and it was perceptions that I spoke of in the
House – that the 1983 Act is all about controlling the actions of dangerous people, or solely concerned
with the prevention of homicide and suicide. Of course, no-one could argue for a moment that this was
the reality of the Act – obviously it is concerned with much else besides, and its powers are far wider than
that would imply. But there is a sense in which any law that seeks to guide professional action, or perhaps
any sort of human agency, has an important symbolic aspect. Many people who are professionally involved
with the Act do not know its detail, and a great many people who are made subject to its powers, or who
know someone who is, will have neither opportunity nor inclination to understand the context or extent
of those powers. The Government’s Bill unbalanced the Act by casting aside some of its definitional
safeguards, and its presentation of its case for doing so has further characterised the Act as being
concerned, above all else, with public safety. This has been the most indelicate handling of legislation that
in fact requires the most delicate of balances to be made. 
This is why I supported those amendments to the Bill as presented to Parliament that Government
dismissed as ‘declaratory’. That is also why it is important that the Mental Health Act, like the Mental
Capacity Act, should be principled legislation that sets out the value of personal autonomy and the need
to use the least restrictive option when intervening for the health of patients, or the protection of patients
or others. And, finally, that is why Government needs to temper its reaction to the reasoned debates over
its Bill, and listen to the weight of expert opinion that is behind the Lords amendments and, I hope,
further amendments to come. 
32 Hansard HL 26/02/07, cols 1482-3
